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Abstract
We ask the following question: If all instantiations of a propo-
sitional formula A(x1, ..., xn) in n propositional variables are decid-
able in some sufficiently strong recursive theory, does it follow that
A is tautological or contradictory? and answer it in the affirmative.
We also consider the following related question: Suppose that for
some propositional formula A(x1, ..., xn), there is a Turing program
P such that P ([φ1], ..., [φn]) ↓= 1 iff N |= A(φ1, ..., φn) and other-
wise P ([φ1], ..., [φn]) ↓= 0 (where [φ] denotes the Gödel number of φ),
does it follow that the truth value of A(φ1, ..., φn) is independent of
φ1, ..., φn and hence that A is tautological or contradictory?
1 Decidability in PA and related systems
Definition 1. Let T be a theory. A propositional formula A(x1, ..., xn) is
always decicable in T iff T decides every sentence of the form A(φ1, ..., φn),
where φ1, ..., φn are closed formulas (without free variables) in the language
of T .
We formulate our claims for the case of PA, but they can be transfered
to arbitrary recursive axiom systems that allow Gödel coding.
Lemma 2. For each n ∈ ω, there is a set of n mutually exclusive non-
refutable formulas, i.e. a set {θ1, ..., θn} of closed LPA formulas such that no
¬θi is provable in PA and such that θi →
∧n
j=1,j 6=i¬θj is provable in PA for
i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Proof. We write φ <p ψ for the statement ‘There is a PA-proof of ¬φ and the
smallest Gödel number n of such a proof is smaller than the smallest Gödel
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number of a proof of ¬ψ, provided there is one’, i.e. ∃x(Bew(x, [¬φ]) ∧
∀y < x¬Bew(y,¬ψ)), where Bew(a, b) denotes ‘a is the Gödel number of a
proof of the closed formula with Gödel number b’. Consider the following
system of statements (we confuse formulas with their Gödel numbers):
(1)
∧n
i=2 z1 <p zi
(2)
∧n
i=1,i 6=2 z2 <p zi
... (n)
∧n
i=1,i 6=n zn <p zi
Applying the Gödel fixpoint theorem generalized to n-tuples of formulas (see
e.g. [1]), we get statements θ1, ..., θn such that
(*) θi ↔
∧n
j=1,j 6=i θi <p θj
is provable in PA for each i ∈ {1, 2, .., n}. We claim that {θ1, ..., θn} is as
desired.
First, if θi and θj are both true (where i 6= j), then there are by (*) (Gödel
numbers of) proofs βi for θi and βj for θj . Now, again by (*), we have βi < βj
and βj < βi, which is impossible. Hence θi implies ¬θj for all j 6= i. This
argument can easily be carried out in PA.
Second, suppose that ¬θi is provable in PA for some i ∈ {1, ..., n}. If ¬θi
is provable, then there is j ∈ {1, ..., n} such that ¬θj is provable and the
minimal Gödel number of a proof of ¬θj is minimal among the minimal
Gödel numbers of proofs of ¬θk for k ∈ {1, ..., n}. Let β be the minimal
Gödel number of a proof of ¬θj . Then PA proves ¬θj . Moroever, it is easily
provable in PA that no k′ < k is a proof for any of the θl, l ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Hence, by (*), PA proves θj , so PA proves θj ∧ ¬θj , a contradiction.
Lemma 3. For each n ∈ ω, there are n formulas φ1, ..., φn in the language
of arithmetic such that for no Boolean combination C of any n− 1 of them,
PA+ C decides the remaining one.
Proof. Let n ∈ ω. By Lemma 2, pick a set S := {θ1, ..., θ2n} of 2
n non-
refutable, mutually exclusive formulas. We will construct φ1, ..., φn as dis-
junctions
∨
R over subsets of S. By choice of the θi, it is clear that θi =⇒∨
R iff θi ∈ R: Clearly, if θi ∈ R, then θi =⇒
∨
R; on the other hand, θi
implies ¬θj for all j 6= i, so θi =⇒ ¬
∨
R if θi /∈ R.
Let f be some bijection between P({1, 2, ..., n}) and S. We proceed to define
subsets S1, ..., Sn of S as follows: We put θi in Sj iff j ∈ f
−1(θj). Hence
each subset of {1, 2, ..., n} is ‘marked’ as the set of j for which Sj contains a
particular θi. Set φi :=
∨
Sj. We claim that {φi|1 ≤ i ≤ n} is as desired.
To see this, consider a combination
∧n
i=1 δiφi where each δi is either ¬
or nothing (i.e. each φi appears once, either plain or negated). Then
E := {i|1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ δi 6= ¬} is a subset of {1, ..., n}. Let θj = f(E).
2
Then by what we just observed, θj implies all elements of E and implies
the negation of all elements of S \ E. Hence θj implies
∧n
i=1 δiφi (and this
implication is provable in PA). Now, if PA+
∧n
i=1 δiφi was inconsistent, so
was PA+ θj . But then, PA would prove ¬θj , contradicting the choice of θj .
Hence PA+
∧n
i=1 δiφi is consistent. As
∧n
i=1 δiφi was arbitrary, {φ1, .., φn} is
indeed as desired.
Remark: This is a generalization of a construction for the case n = 2
given in [3] (p. 19), there attributed to E. Jerabek.
Definition 4. A set S of closed LPA-formulas is independent iff for no finite
S ′ ⊆ S, φ ∈ S \ S ′ and no Boolean combination C of S ′, PA+ C decides φ.
Lemma 5. If S is a finite set of closed LPA formulas, then S is and in-
dependent over PA, iff for every Boolean combination C of the elements
of S (conjunction in which each element of S appears once, either plain or
negated), PA+ C is consistent (provided PA is consistent).
Proof. If some combination C was inconsistent and ψ1, ..., ψn−1 were the first
n−1 conjuncts of C (i.e. φ1, ..., φn−1, either plain or negated), then φn would
be decided by ψ1, ..., ψn−1, contradicting the assumption of independence.
Theorem 6. Every always decidable formula is either tautological or contra-
dictory, i.e.: Let A(x1, ..., xn) be a propositional formula in n propositional
variables x1, ..., xn. Assume that for each n-tuple of LPA-formulas without
free variables (φ1, ..., φn), we have that PA decides A(φ1, ..., φn) (i.e. PA
either proves the sentence or refutes it). Then A is either a tautology or
contradictory.
Proof. Write A in disjunctive normal form. Supppose A is neither tau-
tological nor contradictory. Let B1 : {x1, ..., xn} → {0, 1} be an assign-
ment of truth values to the proposition variables that makes A true and
B2 : {x1, ..., xn} → {0, 1} another one that makes it false. By Lemma 3, let
{φ1, ..., φn} be an independent set of LPA-formulas of cardinality n. Let C1
and C2 be the Boolean combinations corresponding to B1 and B2, respec-
tively. Then PA+C1 and PA+C2 are both consistent by Lemma 5; however,
in PA+C1, A(φ1, ..., φn) is true and in PA+C2, A(φ1, ..., φn) is false. Hence
A(φ1, ..., φn) is not decidable in PA, contradicting the assumption.
2 Algorithmical Decidability of Propositional Forms
We ask a question analogous to that of the preceeding section, where de-
cidability is now taken to mean decidability by a Turing machine: Sup-
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pose that for some propositional formula A(x1, ..., xn), there is a Turing pro-
gram P such that P ([φ1], ..., [φn]) ↓= 1 iff N |= A(φ1, ..., φn) and otherwise
P ([φ1], ..., [φn]) ↓= 0, does it follow that the truth value of A(φ1, ..., φn) is
independent of φ1, ..., φn and hence that A is tautological or contradictory?
It turns out that the answer is yes:
Theorem 7. Let A be a propositional form and let P be a Turing pro-
gram such that P ([φ1], ..., [φn]) ↓= 1 iff N |= A(φ1, ..., φn) and otherwise
P ([φ1], ..., [φn]) ↓= 0. Then A is tautological or contradictory.
Proof. Assume that P is such a program for a propositional formula A. We
build a recursive extension T of PA that can roughly be stated as PA+ ‘P
is always right’. As ‘P is always right’ is true by assumption, T is consistent.
T consists of PA together with the sentence S(φ1,..,φn) := (A(φ1, ..., φn) →
P ([φ1], ..., [φn]) ↓= 1) ∧ (¬A(φ1, ..., φn) → P ([φ1], ..., [φn]) ↓= 0) for every
n-tuple (φ1, ..., φn) of closed formulas. Clearly, T is recursive.
Now, as, by assumption, P halts with output 0 or 1 on every n-tuple (φ1, ..., φn)
of closed formulas, PA will prove this for every single instance; moreoever, T
will, via the extra assumptions, know that P decides correctly and hence de-
cide A(φ1, ..., φn) for every such n-tuple. As Theorem 6 is valid for recursive
extensions of PA, it is valid for T , so A is either a tautology or contradictory,
as desired.
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